A model is developed to analyze optimal product costing and pricing decisions when a firm must make long term commitments to some activity resource capacities. The problem is complex because of interactions between the initial capacity choices and adjustments in product costs and prices in subsequent periods. Price adjustments are required in a dynamic information environment where new information about demand and cost parameters is revealed each period.
PRODUCT COSTING AND PRICING UNDER LONG TERM CAPACITY COMMITMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the issue of optimal product costing and pricing when a monopolist firm must make long term commitment to the capacity of activity resources.
Both economic and relevant cost analyses in managerial accounting advocate that committed fixed costs such as capacity costs should not be charged to products because these costs are sunk and therefore irrelevant in decision making. However, most firms charge such costs to products and rely on them for product pricing decisions (Shim and Sudit 1995; Govindrajan and Anthony 1983) . Activity based costing is claimed as the correct procedure to charge those committed costs to products based on cause and effect relationship (Cooper and Kaplan 1987) . This practice of charging committed fixed costs to products and then using such product costs to price the products has lead managerial accounting researches to explore the economic rationale explaining why firms engage in such a practice.
Several reasons appear in the managerial accounting literature for rationalizing the allocation of fixed costs. These include opportunity costs (Kaplan and Thompson 1971; Kaplan and Welam 1974; Miller and Buckman 1987; Balachandran and Srinidhi 1987; Banker, Datar and Kekre 1988) , managerial incentives (Zimmerman 1979 ) and capacity choices (Balachandran, Li and Magee 1987; Whang 1989) . Banker and Hughes (1994) study the twin issues of how the committed activity resource costs enter into optimal capacity and pricing decisions and the information needs of decentralized decision makers to implement those decisions in a single period model and derive the optimality of a pricing rule that relies on activity based product costs that include charges for committed resources. This has led others to explore the same issue in different settings such as when there exist hard capacity constraints (Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan 1996; Balachandran, Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan 1997) . More recently several researchers have focused on comparing the performance of different heuristic rules for pricing and capacity planning. Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan (2001) and Banker and Hansen (2001) compare the performance of different heuristics for the joint capacity planning and pricing problem. Gox (2001) evaluates the performance of different heuristic rules in a two-period planning model that considers price changes required to achieve better utilization of committed capacity levels.
Our objective is to analyze how optimal product costs differ across periods when capacity is committed at the outset but new information is available for the pricing decision in each subsequent period. For this purpose, we extend the Banker-Hughes (B&H hereafter) framework and develop a multiperiod model of long term capacity commitment in a dynamic information environment. In our model, the capacity commitment decision is followed by several periods in which pricing decisions are made.
New information about demand and costs is revealed at the beginning of each period.
Consequently, unlike B&H, the activity based costing is not economically sufficient (Amershi, Banker and Datar 1990) for the optimal pricing decision in our model because the charge for committed capacity differs from its activity cost. We show that the optimal charge for committed resources differs across period by a factor that increases monotonically with the optimal demand for the resource in each period.
We show that a benchmark solution similar to B&H single period model is obtained if the firm must commit to a fixed price for each product over the entire planning horizon. More importantly, the average of the expected optimal prices over all the periods in the unrestricted model when prices fluctuate with new information, is simply equal to the B&H benchmark price based on full costs. Our study differs from earlier research in two ways. First, we develop a theoretical model to study the capacity, pricing and product costing decisions in a multiperiod dynamic information environment when capacity is committed for the long term. Second, we identify conditions under which it is optimal to carry idle capacity and provide theoretical support for charging less than the full cost of capacity to products when idle capacity exists balanced by charging more than the full cost in other periods.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a multiperiod capacity planning and pricing model. Section III presents the analytical results for optimal pricing and product costing decisions in the multiperiod setting. A special case of the multiperiod model related to optimality of idle capacity under demand growth expectations appears in section IV. Section V concludes the paper with a brief summary of the model results.
II. LONG TERM CAPACITY COMMITMENT MODEL
We consider a multiperiod capacity planning and pricing problem for a monopolist firm. The firm produces J products (indexed by 
where
We use the following vector notation to simplify our presentation. 
where The first term on the right hand side of (3) represents the expected fixed cost. These costs do not vary with actual production level t q but increase with the activity capacities x .
The second term comprises of expected variable costs directly proportional to product quantities. The third term reflects the expected spot premium to obtain additional capacity when the realized demand requires support activity resources exceeding the committed capacity.
We denote the expected total usage of activity i necessary for the expected
, and the actual total . In addition, we define 
Now the expected profit to the firm can be expressed by
Given this profit function we next analyze the ex ante optimal capacity and price choices of the firm.
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We begin our analysis with the optimal ex ante capacity and period-by-period pricing choices of the multi-product monopolist. The firm selects the capacity level i x for each resource i at the very beginning, but chooses a different price for each subsequent period based on information available to it at the beginning of each period. The following lemma characterizes the optimal choices of capacities and prices given the information available at the time each decision is made. 
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that the firm has to solve a set of
simultaneously to determine the optimal capacity levels for the I resources and the optimal prices for the J products in each state t η in each of T periods. Clearly, this is a complex problem when the number of products or state realizations is large. The RHS of equation (5) is the expected marginal cost of adding an extra unit of capacity averaged over all T periods and the LHS is equal to the average expected marginal cost of procuring an extra unit of capacity in the spot market should the need arise. The firm chooses the optimum capacity level so that it is indifferent between these two options at the margin. Though complicated, this expression is similar in spirit to the B&H result.
Equation (5) can be rewritten as:
Equation (7) suggests that the average expected spot premium must be greater than the expected unit cost of installing an additional unit of capacity for the firm to invest ex ante in any capacity. This is analogous to B&H's requirement that the spot premium factor be greater than one. However, the spot premium factor can be less than one in our model in some states of the economy as may happen during economic downturns.
For the pricing decision the firm trades off the expected marginal loss in contribution margin on the LHS of equation (6) against the expected marginal cost savings through reduction in spot premium for exceeding the optimal capacities shown on the RHS of equation (6). We can rewrite the price equation in a form similar to B&H as follows:
Similar to B&H, the optimal price has two components, one related to the demand parameters ( )
α η β and the other related to production cost parameters that are based on the optimal capacity choice. However, it is clear that unlike B&H the optimal prices are not independent of the optimal capacity choices, and the optimal capacity choices require the knowledge of cost information ( ) m η . Thus, in the optimal product cost, there is a charge for each activity over or under its expected unit cost (even though this cost is committed), depending on whether
is greater than or less than one.
In the analysis above we allowed the firm to dynamically adjust the price of its products in the product market. Though this is possible for many commodities and services, such as gasoline and air travel, firms often do not have this flexibility. This is true in long term customer-supplier relationships that require upfront price commitments by the supplier, as is prevalent in the auto industry. Hence, next we explore the optimal prices when the firm must commit to a single price for each product through all periods. 
We call these restricted optimal choices the benchmark capacities and prices as they are similar in form to the B&H single period results that effectively decouple the pricing from capacity choices. Thus, if the firm has to commit to a price up front, the charge for each activity is similar to that in the B&H model. Though these benchmark capacity and price choices are interesting in their own right, an important question is how they are related to the unrestricted optimal choices given in lemma 1. We address this question in our first proposition below. It is interesting to note that the benchmark price is simply an average of the expected optimal price across T periods. Thus, when forced to commit to a price for all T periods, the firm simply chooses the expected optimal price over the T periods. Parts two and three of proposition 1 show that the expected demand for resources and the expected shortage cost are also identical over the T periods. However, we know that the optimal profit is higher for the firm when implementing the unrestricted optimal prices compared to the common benchmark price in all periods. An interesting question is where does this gain come from, since the expected shortage costs are the same in both cases. The answer is that the gain comes from demand management. By charging different prices in different periods, the firm is better able to manage its demand, as it can stimulate the demand by charging lower prices when the demand is expected to be low and dampen the demand by charging higher prices when the demand is expected to be high. Therefore, the opportunity cost of the available committed capacity is lower when the demand is low and higher when the demand is high. This difference requires the firm to optimally manipulate the charge for the committed resources in different states based on the expected demand and cost parameters in each state.
The variance between the optimal price and the benchmark price
Thus, the difference between the optimal and the benchmark price can arise due to three reasons, the base level demand, the variable costs and the charge for the committed resources. The variable ( ) t i t λ η is the expected fixed cost adjustment factor, which equals the probability of capacity shortage multiplied by the spot premium. The first two reasons are exogenous to the firm, but the firm's accounting system can adjust the charge for the committed resource. Next we characterize this charge in the optimal solution and compare it to the benchmark solution. (ii)
Depending on whether the expected fixed cost adjustment factor ( ) 1 Proposition 2 shows that the charge for a committed resource depends directly on the expected demand for that resource. The greater is the demand for it, the smaller is the slack in its available capacity and therefore the greater is the charge for it. Thus, if there is a high likelihood of idle capacity for a resource, it is optimal to lower the charge for it and increase the demand by reducing prices.
IV. OPTIMALITY OF IDLE CAPACITY
Firms acquire capacity based on long term strategic plans that forecast future needs. The capacity acquired by the firm may not be put into full utilization when it is acquired but may be used strategically to meet future demand growth. Thus, firms may invest in capacity in the current period anticipating the needs for both current and future demand. This may lead firms to carry idle capacity till the demand for relatively new products ramps up to higher levels. For example, the case "Societé Bonlieu" (Shank, 1996) describes a situation where the company invested 18 million francs in a new kiln that had a capacity of 10.6 cubic meters per week but was operating at only 2.2 cubic meters a week The investment was with the expectation that the kiln capacity will be required for the future growth in product demand. The central question in the case is how the cost of the idle kiln capacity should be allocated to production in the current period.
Another example of such a situation is the Fab 30 plant built by AMD Saxony GmbH in Dresden, Germany (http://www.amd.com/locations/aboutfab.html). Fab 30 is a state of the art manufacturing facility equipped with 0.18 micron technology. The facility cost AMD $1.9 billion. It started producing SRAMS in December 1998. In January 1999, AMD-K6 family of processors was introduced. Some of the capacity was idle for several months before several other high performance processors were added subsequently. The
Fab is expected to soon fully utilize the capacity, producing the AMD Athlon series of processors using copper interconnect technology licensed from Motorola. The central question is how the facility costs should be allocated to products over the economic life of the facility. The opposite situation occurs when a firm is in a declining market for its product line or economic conditions reduce the demand for existing products. Examples abound, as demand recession is widespread at present in the telecommunications industry.
Although the problem of product costing when firms carry strategic idle capacity, or face idle capacity due to declining demands, is pervasive, there is little theoretical guidance available in the extant management accounting literature. To address this issue
with a relatively simple model, we adapt our multiperiod capacity planning and pricing model to a two period setting where the firm expects future growth or decline of a product line. In order to keep our focus on the main issue of capacity and pricing decisions for product growth or decline, we assume that there is no residual uncertainty in costs and that the spot premium factor i θ is same for both periods. We continue to The first term on the RHS of equation (11) is the committed resource capacity costs for the two-period model. The second term represents the variable costs for the two periods.
The last term is the spot premium cost if the demand exceeds capacity in either period.
Using the notation defined in section II, we can express the total usage of activity i to support actual production as Again, if the actual demand for resource i is greater than the initially committed resource capacity, i.e. Equation (13) equates the average expected cost of spot premium over two periods with the marginal cost of acquiring additional capacity in the first period. Equation (14) equates the expected marginal loss in contribution margin with the expected marginal cost savings in terms of reduction in spot premiums for exceeding the optimal capacities.
We can rewrite equation (14) 
Again we see that the optimal price has two components, one related to demand and the other related to production costs. We will further analyze the capacity and pricing choices in detail after transforming the equation (13) and (14) by defining a new set of variables.
Thus i γ is the ratio of the shortage probabilities in period 1 and period 2. Denoting the optimal i γ as * i γ we can rewrite the optimal capacities and prices as follows: Note that
γ is a function of optimal amount of resource i committed and the optimal expected demand for resource i in both periods. If the firm acquires capacity based on the anticipation that there will be demand growth, a question of interest is if it is optimal for the firm to carry idle capacity. The following proposition addresses this question.
Proposition 3:
There exists a critical value of the spot premium factor This indicates that the firm's choice to carry strategic idle capacity for demand growth depends on the expected need for the future periods as well as the spot premium that it has to pay if the capacity is not acquired at the beginning of first period. In fact, irrespective of the demand parameters the firm will carry idle capacity if the spot premium factor for each resource is greater than or equal to 2 even if the demand is invariant across the two periods. Thus, the critical value for idle capacity is reduced from 2 in the B&H model because of the anticipation of future demand growth in our model.
The greater is the difference between the expected demands between the two periods, the lower is the critical value c i θ below 2. Thus, in our model, there are two reasons to carry idle capacity: one due to the spot premium factor, and the other due to anticipated demand growth.
The next question we ask is how the committed capacity cost should be charged to products to support optimal pricing decisions when the firm carries idle capacity in the first period to serve the anticipated demand growth or when the demand for a product declines in the second period due to phasing out or economic recession. We provide some insight into this question in our next proposition. This proposition supports the intuition that current products should not be allocated the cost of strategic idle capacity when that capacity is actually meant for the demand in expected subsequent periods. Similarly if the demand for a particular product is expected to decline, the capacity charge in the second period should be reduced from that in the first period. Thus, the firm can reduce the capacity charge to stimulate the demand when idle capacity is expected.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a product costing and pricing model under long term capacity commitment to analyze the interaction between the initial capacity choice and subsequent product costing and pricing decisions in a dynamic information environment.
The optimal product costs in our model differ from the activity based costs in the B&H single period model except when the firm must commit to a common price for all periods.
We showed that depending on the spot premium cost, the charges for fixed resources can be higher than, lower than or equal to the benchmark charge that results under price commitment. Using our model in a two period context, we demonstrated the optimality of carrying idle capacity when the firm expects demand growth in the second period. When it is optimal for the firm to carry idle capacity in the first period, it is also optimal for the firm to charge less for committed resources in the first period compared to the second period. This intuition holds also if the demand is expected to decline in the second period resulting in a lower expected capacity utilization and hence a lower capacity charge in the second period.
We 
First order condition (FOC) with respect to i x gives
Similarly the FOC with respect to
The expected profit function under price commitment is 
On the other hand, the FOC with respect to j p gives ( )
Denoting the optimal price as (iii) It follows directly from above. 
Proposition 4:
The optimal price and quantities for both products fro two period are 
